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Electoral Quotas: Should the UK learn from the rest of the world? Sweden, Cuba, Finland, Netherlands, Argentina (40-47%), Denmark, Angola, Costa Rica, Spain, Norway (36-39%) (see Game, 2009, p.167 ).
There are 15 black and minority ethnic (BME) MPs: 13 Labour and two Conservative -2.3% compared with 8% of the UK population as a whole. The number of known disabled MPs is smaller still -partly because of those who, like the PM himself, blind in his left eye following a teenage rugby accident, simply don't regard or declare themselves as impaired. Even with this qualification, though, the true figure would most likely be well below the 9.5% of adults describing themselves in the 2001 Census as having "a long-term illness, health problem or disability" that limited their daily activities or the work they could do.
On all three characteristics, local councillors are more reflective of their electorates than are MPs, although especially in the case of women the disparity is still both substantial and seemingly entrenched. In 2008 the proportion of women among the 22,300 councillors on Great Britain's 442 principal local authorities reached, for the first time, 30% (LGA/IDAA 2008). It had taken exactly 100 years -since the 1907 legislation permitting the election of women to all-purpose local councils -to reach this symbolic milestone (Game, 2009, pp. 154-57) . At recent rates of progress, it would take most of a further century to approach gender parity. At least women's representation is increasing.
The proportion of BME councillors is currently falling -from 4.1% in 2006 to 3.4% in 2008 -although most of this reversal is attributable to the Labour Party's heavy loss of seats in all recent sets of local elections. Interestingly, the 13.3% of self-declared disabled councillors is actually higher than the 9.5% Census figure.
These representational disparities can be seen as direct consequences of the major parties' largely unregulated candidate selection markets, and, just as with financial markets, it seems that at least some of our politicians, albeit late in the day, are coming to recognise that perhaps there is a case for greater intervention in these markets, and maybe even recourse to the law. For the evidence strongly suggests that almost all the countries that have managed noticeably to increase the electoral chances of underrepresented groups have done so through electoral systems and regulations that foster that objective. The UK, on the other hand, has historically had an electoral system that restricts representational diversity, reinforced, in respect of the operation of its parties, by a laissez-faire political culture.
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Electoral engineering and the representation of minorities
Just as civil engineers design houses, roads and bridges, electoral engineers design electoral systems. Given the specifications, they can produce systems to achieve almost any desired outcome: simplicity, proportionality, inclusiveness, 'strong' and stable government, higher turnout, voter choice, minimal vote wastage, exclusion of extremists -including the outcome that concerns us here: increased representation of previously under-represented minorities ('minority' being used here of women in obviously a purely representational sense). The world's leading electoral engineers are the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (see, for example, IDEA 2005) and it is their approach that is summarised here.
The IDEA design model comprises three main electoral system variables:
• District magnitude -the number of representatives elected per electoral division at any particular election • The formula -that determines how the winner or winners are decided
• Ballot structure -whether the elector votes for a candidate or a party, and whether they make a single choice or can express a series of preferences.
Each variable can have its impact on the chances of minority group candidates being nominated and elected. With district magnitude, for example, multi-member constituencies permit party selectors to nominate a list of candidates. To maximize the appeal of their list, they are more likely, the reasoning goes, to nominate a diverse, 'balanced' slate than if they were picking just one candidate. The greater the district magnitude, the longer will be the party lists of nominees, and the greater the likelihood of candidate, and eventually representative, diversity.
Bringing the three electoral system variables together, both a priori reasoning and the international literature (DCLG, 2007b, pp. 22-24) suggest that party-centred, multimember constituency systems of proportional representation (PR) are the most favourable combination for the election of minority group representatives. As for the least favourable combination, the picture is even more clear-cut: it is the mostly singlemember constituency, candidate-centred plurality systems that until recently were all that voters in Great Britain had experienced: "This is a global tendency. Women's representation in parliaments in the world is around twice as high in countries with PR for elections that produce strong, preferably single-party, majority governments, rather than a proportionate representation either of the range of competing parties or of specific groups within the electorate. Secondly, this ideological distaste for minority representation is reinforced by the very nature of the electoral system, which makes it difficult to apply quotas in any case. Indeed, if you are selecting only a single candidate for a single electoral district, it is not just difficult, but impossible, to introduce both men and women at the same time as in a party list system.
If there is to be external intervention, it effectively has to come at the nomination stage of the candidate selection process, and the most noteworthy example in the UK has been the Labour Party's use of all-women shortlists. There had been previous, not conspicuously successful, attempts by parties to require the inclusion of at least one woman on candidate shortlists, but, in the run-up to the 1997 General Election, Labour adopted a policy of requiring that all-women shortlists be used to select candidates in half of all vacant seats that the party was likely to win. It was, unsurprisingly, extremely controversial and in 1996 was contested -by two 'excluded' male candidates claiming, to the satisfaction of an industrial tribunal, that the lists were themselves in breach of the Sex Discrimination Act. However, 39 women candidates had already been selected, 35 in seats the party judged winnable, all of whom were elected.
The two other major national UK parties -the Conservatives and Liberal Democratsare both opposed to such forms of affirmative action, and neither has sought to use it even since it was legalised in the Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002. It was Labour also, therefore, who, for the first elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh and London Assemblies (1998-2000) , introduced a system of twinning. Party members of two neighbouring and comparably winnable constituencies met together jointly to select their candidates, with the requirement that one be a man and the other a woman. In 2004 the party instituted all-women shortlists for local government elections, and they were also used in the 2005 General Election.
Which brings us back to the potential importance of the Speaker's Conference, and the tradition that such conferences are expected to make recommendations specifically about changes in the law. The 2002 Act did the immediate job it was designed to do -namely to exclude from the purview of the Sex Discrimination Act any action by a political party to reduce inequality in the numbers of men and women elected to political office. Parties GAME:
Electoral Quotas: Should the UK learn from the rest of the world? could, if they chose, use devices like women-only shortlists. But it was entirely permissive -so innocuous, in fact, that the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats did not even oppose it. For reformers, therefore, it was a prescriptive opportunity lost: an opportunity to compel parties to adopt positive action to reduce inequality, to set candidate diversity targets for other groups as well as for women, and to institute a tariff of financial penalties for non-compliance. They will be expecting such questions to feature on the Speaker's Conference agenda.
